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On Thyrsus-Bearers and Mystics
or,
On the Meaning of the Word "Initiation"
as they say in the mysteries, ‘the thyrsus-bearers are many, but the mystics few’; and these mystics are, I believe, those who have been true philosophers.[1]
So sayeth Socrates in the Phaedo of Plato. But what does he mean by this? Fortunately for us, a thyrsus is typically associated with the worship of Dionysus, and the word translated here as “mystics” is “Bacchoi”. This tells us that “the mysteries” are Bacchic, and indeed Olympiodorus specifically identifies this as a quote of Orpheus[2]. Thus, the quote above refers to the Orphic variety of Bacchic mysteries, and the sentiment boils down to something along the lines of “many talk the talk, but few walk the walk”. Socrates clarifies that he considers philosophy to be the mysticism, the “true” form of worship or ‘walking the walk’.
This philosophical interpretation of the mysteries, which prioritizes cultivation of the soul, finds a mythical parallel in the dismemberment of Dionysus. Plutarch, commenting on that myth, expands this viewpoint:
the stories told about the sufferings and dismemberment of Dionysus and the outrageous assaults of the Titans upon him, and their punishment and blasting by thunderbolt after they had tasted his blood - all this is a myth which in its inner meaning has to do with rebirth. For to that faculty in us which is unreasonable and disordered and violent, and does not come from the gods, but from evil spirits, the ancients gave the name Titans, that is to say, those that are punished and subjected to correction. . . .[3]
Plutarch here is saying that it is necessary to suppress that within oneself which is unreasonable or chaotic, and he relates this to the mythological dismemberment of Dionysus. This implies that, in opposition to our Titanic nature, our Dionysian nature is that which is reasonable, ordered, and non-violent. Proclus further elucidates this position in his commentary on Plato’s Cratylus:
The intellect in us is Dionysian and truly an image of Dionysus. Therefore, anyone that transgresses it and, like the Titans, scatters its undivided nature by fragmented falsehood, this person clearly sins against Dionysus himself, even more than those who transgress against external images of the God, to the extent that the intellect more than other things is akin to the God.[4]
Proclus even goes so far as to say that the intellect more closely resembles Dionysus than any statue or icon, and to transgress against intellect is therefore worse than transgression against those “external images”. The three of these excerpts in succession suggest that to escape reincarnation, it is paramount to cultivate one’s intellect and at the same time correct one’s chaotic or unreasonable urges.
Turning now to Plato’s Republic, he tells of “begging priests and soothsayers” who wander around in search of rich clients. He says that those itinerant priests offer an array of services, such as purification (including of blood-guilt) and harming enemies, and that “they are masters of spells and enchantments that constrain the gods to serve their end”[5]. Immediately following that, he quotes a few verses each of Hesiod and Homer before saying that they use books of Orpheus and Musaeus:
And for all these sayings they cite the poets as witnesses, with regard to the ease and plentifulness of vice, quoting:
Evil-doing in plenty a man shall find for the seeking;
Smooth is the way and it lies near at hand and is easy to enter;
But on the pathway of virtue the gods put sweat from the first step;
(Hes. WD 287-289)and a certain long and uphill road. And others cite Homer as a witness to the beguiling of gods by men, since he too said:
The gods themselves are moved by prayers,
And men by sacrifice and soothing vows,
And incense and libation turn their wills
Praying, whenever they have sinned and made transgression.
(Hom. Il. 9.497)And they produce a bushel of books of Musaeus and Orpheus, the offspring of the Moon and of the Muses, as they affirm, and these books they use in their ritual, and make not only ordinary men but states believe that there really are remissions of sins and purifications for deeds of injustice, by means of sacrifice and pleasant sport2 for the living, and that there are also special rites for the defunct, which they call functions, that deliver us from evils in that other world, while terrible things await those who have neglected to sacrifice.[6]
As argued in a previous essay, this excerpt from Plato suggests that there is a dichotomy between proper and improper handling of sacred truths. This essay thus far has shown similar sentiments from Socrates and from Plutarch and Proclus. This critique is not merely a Platonic or later philosophical idea; centuries earlier, the anonymous author of the Derveni Papyrus expressed a similar lament for certain new initiates who do not bother to understand things (or even worse, assume they already do):
As for those men who believe that they learned when they witnessed the rites while performing them together with other people in the cities, I wonder less that they do not understand; for it is not possible to hear and simultaneously comprehend what is being said. But those who believe that they learned from someone who makes a profession of the rites deserve to be wondered at and pitied: wondered at because, although they believe before they perform the rites that they will learn, they go away after performing them before having learned, without even asking further questions, as if they knew something of what they saw or heard or were taught; and pitied because it is not enough for them that they paid the fee in advance – they also go away devoid even of their belief. Before they perform the rites expecting to acquire knowledge, but after performing them they go away devoid even of expectation.[7]
The Derveni author here raises the same issue as in the Republic; “those who believe that they learned from someone who makes a profession of the rites deserve to be wondered at and pitied” is wholly in-line with Plato’s derision of itinerant priests. In the Derveni Papyrus, however, the author also says that fault lies just as much with the initiate in those situations as with the initiator, and that one cannot expect to learn without some level of inquisitiveness.
Theophrastus presents a different kind of mishandling or misunderstanding of the mysteries, illustrated in his Characters portrait of the 'Superstitious Man':
He goes to the Orphic mysteries to be initiated into them. You will be sure to find him amongst the people who frequent the beach to besprinkle themselves. Every month he goes there with his wife, or if his wife is busy, then with the nurse and children.[8]
This ‘Superstitious Man’ does not represent all Orphics, however, in the same way that none of the other excerpts take blanket issue with Orphism. Theophrastus’ ‘Superstitious Man’ is one who displays many other paranoid idiosyncrasies. All of the above excerpts and insights, when taken together, show a complex and easily misinterpreted understanding of Orphic initiation:
Initiation is a demarcation of one’s current mortal life. It is meant to be a transformation in itself, which forever splits the participant’s life into a “before” and an “after”. Before, maybe they didn’t recognize what they were lacking or even that they were lacking at all. After, the participant is newly and better equipped to navigate mythology, philosophy, and life.
This demarcation is not meant to be a one-time, permanent, and irreversible seal. Yes, it is a specific transformative event or period, but what that awakens within oneself is the true pursuit of the act. In the case of Theophrastus’ ‘Superstitious Man’, there is no magic number of initiations that will permanently save him, because he has not truly been initiated: the act did not awaken in him the pious passion for understanding and improvement which separates the Mystics from the Thyrsus-Bearers at large.
If one’s initiation is not meant to be a singular or even repeating event, but rather a true initiation in the sense of kick-starting a lifelong passion for philosophy and self-improvement, then the asceticism of the Orphic life similarly shifts in focus away from a paranoid avoidance of potential miasma; In this case, ‘walking the walk’ of asceticism, and cultivating the Soul in doing so, acts as a strict training regimen, which over the course of one or many lifetimes reaffirms to the Soul that it can reject incarnation. When the Soul has internalized this information, when it finally rejects its Titanic nature completely, it is free to ascend in union to the Gods.
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Works Cited
Duvick, Brian Marshall, et al. Proclus: On Plato Cratylus. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2007.
Kouremenos, Theokritos, et al. The Derveni Papyrus. Leo S. Olschki Editore, 2006.
Plato. “Phaedo.” Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 1 translated by Harold North Fowler; Introduction by W.R.M. Lamb. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1966. Perseus Digital Library. https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.01.0170. Accessed 1 Oct 2025.
Plato. Republic. Translated by R.G. Bury. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967 & 1968.), Perseus Digital Library. https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.01.0168. Accessed 1 Oct 2025.
Plutarch. “On Eating Meat.” Moralia. with an English Translation by Harold Cherniss and William C. Helmbold. Cambridge, MA. Harvard University Press. London. William Heinemann Ltd. 1957. 12. Perseus Digital Library. http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:2008.01.0377:section=7. Accessed 1 Oct 2025.
Theophrastus. “Characters.” The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Characters of Theophrastus, https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/58242/pg58242-images.html. Accessed 1 Oct 2025.
Westerink, L. G. The Greek Commentaries on Plato’s Phaedo, Vol. 1. Netherlands, North-Holland Publishing Company, 1976.
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